CHILD LABOUR: Work below the minimum age for work, as established in national legislation that conforms to international standards, includes the worst forms of child labour.¹

WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR: Refer to activities such as... forced labour, slavery, prostitution...and hazardous work, in accordance with the ILO Convention.²

HAZARDOUS WORK: Work which, by its nature or the circumstances under which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of the child.³ ILO directs countries to consult with employers and workers to identify the types of hazardous work that should be prohibited by law or regulation.⁴ Hazardous work lists may describe specific activities, occupations, industries, or conditions.

CHILD LABOUR IN TOBACCO FALLS UNDER “WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR”⁵
The hazards of tobacco handling⁶ and toxic exposure to pesticides used in tobacco farming are undisputed. Child labour in tobacco rightfully falls under the category “worst forms of child labour” due to the hazardous nature of work in the tobacco sector. According to International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, child labour in such sectors should be prohibited along with forced labour and commercial exploitation of children (prostitution and pornography). Countries like India, Brazil, Malawi⁷ South Africa, Uganda, Ghana,⁸ prohibits or penalizes those that allow children to work in tobacco fields.⁹

COUNTRIES REPORTED TO HAVE CHILD LABOUR IN TOBACCO¹⁰
About 125 countries produce tobacco¹¹ with the majority of the world’s tobacco grown in China and India.¹² However, reports on child labour are scanty.

1. Argentina 8. Kyrgyz Republic
2. Bangladesh 9. Lebanon
3. Brazil 10. Malawi
4. Cambodia 11. Mexico
5. India 12. Mozambique
6. Indonesia 13. Nicaragua
15. Tanzania 16. Uganda
17. Vietnam 18. Zambia
19. Zimbabwe

Source: US Department of Labour, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labour or Forced Labour.
Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Child Labour: An Inherent Contradiction

Tobacco is uniquely harmful and kills half of its users. The tobacco industry’s commercial interest is in conflict with basic human rights. The tobacco industry’s so-called CSR and self-reporting is counterproductive. Furthermore, the tobacco control treaty requires policies on tobacco production to be protected from tobacco industry interference.

To give an impression of fighting child labour, transnational tobacco companies flaunt their self-reporting system on agricultural practices and supply chain audit (due diligence) regimes; as well as their anti-child labour initiatives, which is largely based on the work of Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing (ECLT). In undertaking such so-called social responsibility (CSR) activities to eliminate child labour, the transnational tobacco companies give a false notion that it is comparable with the rest of the business community, thereby diverting attention from the fact that tobacco production is not like any other business: tobacco products are unique in that they provide no social benefit, kill 8 (eight) million people annually and cost the global economy USD 1.4 trillion every year.

Publicity of the so-called CSR, in addition to being a violation of many tobacco sponsorship bans around the world, also gives a false impression that the tobacco industry can be relied on to undertake voluntary due diligence practices on its supply chain; even when World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) provides that the tobacco industry must be strictly regulated by governments and cannot be trusted to provide any form of self-regulation.

The tobacco industry employs a public relations strategy that diverts attention from the true impact of child labour in tobacco production, obscures genuine solutions, undermines diversification strategies, drowns the voices of stakeholders, and escapes culpability.

Consistent with expert recommendations and good practices, WHO FCTC guidance recommends strong government regulation and frameworks, independent research, and diversification that are sustainably financed and protected from tobacco industry interference.

Because of the need to protect against TI interference, non-government organisations (NGOs) and government officials refuse partnerships with the tobacco industry. Only civil society not affiliated with the tobacco industry are allowed to engage with governments; private sector partnerships of the tobacco industry with the governments are not acceptable.
**IMPACT ON THE CHILD**

- **Nicotine poisoning** with symptoms such as insomnia, dizziness, headaches, dehydration, fatigue, nausea and vomiting caused by absorption of nicotine via skin during the handling of tobacco (*Green tobacco sickness*).[^34]

- **Impeded economic and social advancement** of the child due to loss of education.[^35]

- **High risk of cancer, tuberculosis, infertility, psychological imbalance, immune system dysfunction and neurological damage** due to long durations of hazardous exposure to chemicals such as pesticides, herbicides, fumigants and growth inhibitors, causing serious health harms.[^36]

- **Long term malnutrition and infectious diseases** due to poor nutrition and hygiene during developmental stage owing to lack of adequate food, clean water and sanitation facilities.[^37]

- **Long term musculoskeletal damage** due to repetitive strain injuries resulting in chronic pain, arthritis, muscle twitching and bending of bones; caused by constant heavy lifting and strenuous manual labour.[^38]

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**UNFAIR PRACTICES OF TOBACCO COMPANIES THAT AGGRAVATE CHILD LABOUR:**

Tobacco workers and stakeholders assert that tobacco companies are “perpetuating extreme forms of child labour” and provide these practices as basis. Tobacco companies:

A. **Keep wages low.** Tobacco companies determine the level of wages and have control over the salaries that suppliers or contractors pay.[^39]

B. **Keep tobacco prices low and loan interest rates high** for agricultural inputs. Tobacco companies “determine the price of agricultural inputs, seeds, pesticides, and other supplies,...as well as the price and classification of the tobacco leaf once it’s harvested... small farmers have little control or room to negotiate.”[^41]

C. **Provide incentives such as loans** that keep farmers dependent, although real prices or financial benefits remain low.[^42] The solution to eliminating child labour in the tobacco sector lies in shifting farmers to alternative livelihoods.

D. **Deny rights to organize**[^43] and refuse to accept unions as part of negotiations,[^44] leading to a lack of collective bargaining agreements and freedom of association.[^45]

E. **Drown out voices of genuine stakeholders.** The involvement of tobacco executives and tobacco-funded groups in so-called CSR activities further obscure the voice of the real stakeholders.[^46] Tobacco companies use agricultural front groups, partner with renowned organizations, and work with businessmen and politicians to lobby against tobacco control measures, effectively suppressing progress towards diversification strategies.[^47]

F. **Allow living and working conditions to remain poor.** This includes poor housing, poor drinking water, polluted soils, reduced protections of occupational health and safety. Notably, tobacco companies encourage “excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals”.[^48]

G. **Avoid having direct responsibility over the welfare of farmers.** To avoid culpability for the above practices, the tobacco companies hide behind layers of contracts and protocols.[^49] The tobacco companies have not shown that their contracts fully protect the sector against child labour (i.e., where wages and prices are sufficiently high, or where they take responsibility for child labour and cover for damages arising from the same).
PARTS OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN WHERE CHILD LABOUR IN TOBACCO HAPPENS

Child labour happens mainly in the production stage of the tobacco supply chain up to delivery to leaf buyers and/or factories for manufacture. Tobacco companies have not looked through its whole supply chain to stamp out child labour. Notably, most of its CSR focuses on farms.

- **Growers/Farmers**
- **Leaf dryers / processors**
- **Leaf storage facility**
- **Local Leaf buyers or consolidators/ cooperatives**
- **Cigarette / tobacco factory**
- **Distributor/ Exporter**
- **Importer/ Wholesaler**
- **Retailer**
- **Consumer**

TYPES OF HAZARDOUS WORK IN TOBACCO SECTOR UNDERTAKEN BY CHILDREN

Agriculture, in general, is classified as one of the three most hazardous sectors of activity, along with construction and mining. As of 2020, 112 million children are employed in agriculture, which makes up 70% of all children in child labour, and mostly include children aged 5 to 11 years. Children employed in tobacco perform the following tasks, which have severe detrimental consequences on the health and safety of the child.

- Cutting tobacco leaves
- Planting tobacco seedlings
- Watering fields
- Applying fertilizers
- Mixing and applying pesticides
- Spreading tobacco in the sun to dry
- Harvesting tobacco leaves by hand
- Carrying bundles of harvested leaves
- Bundling dried tobacco into bales
- Removing flowers and competing leaves from plants
- Tying or piercing leaves to attach them to bamboo sticks for drying
- Lifting sticks of tobacco leaves and loading them into curing barns
- Climbing onto beams in curing barns to hang tobacco to dry
- Maintaining fires to heat curing barns
- Untying dried tobacco leaves from bamboo sticks
- Sorting and classifying dried tobacco
- Wrapping or rolling of leaves to prepare them for curing
- Digging with hoes to prepare fields for planting

How does the tobacco industry undermine efforts to eliminate child labour?

01. Tobacco industry’s public relations (PR) and lobbying strategies to eliminate child labour are diametrically opposed to internationally-agreed solutions to child labour.

Aside from the ILO’s strategies to address decent work deficits in the tobacco sector⁵⁵, the WHO FCTC’s Policy Options and Recommendations on Economically Viable Alternatives to Tobacco Growing (in relation to articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC)⁵⁶ laid out strategies to address problems in tobacco production including child labour. This primarily calls for farmer and worker-driven policies and programs towards diversification⁵⁷ that are sustainably financed and protected from tobacco industry interference.⁵⁸ However, the tobacco companies lobby and influence policy making (even use undue influence) to delay or resist tobacco control⁵⁹, to exaggerate its contribution to the economy,⁶⁰ dilute political will through symbiotic relationships with the tobacco industry and politicians,⁶¹ and use front groups that promote tobacco company interests⁶² effectively drowning out genuine stakeholder interests.

- Agreed solutions also include recommendations for tobacco-growing countries to “consider reallocating public funds/subsidies used for tobacco production to alternative livelihoods/activities.”⁶³ In contrast, the tobacco industry is leveraging on incentives that ensure dependency on the crop⁶⁴, despite tobacco prices remaining low.⁶⁵

- The tobacco industry falsely uses economic downfall and worker’s plight in tobacco agriculture to counter tobacco tax increases.⁶⁶ when in reality, the rate of change in consumption allows sufficient time for adjustments towards diversification.⁶⁷

- Sustainable financing of diversification programs is crucial in eliminating child labour in tobacco, and yet, the tobacco companies vehemently oppose all forms of tobacco tax increases, including those that have a potential to sustainably fund diversification programs.⁶⁸

02. The tobacco industry’s practice of incentivizing tobacco production and undermining diversification strategies keeps farmers addicted to tobacco farming, and children tied to labouring on tobacco farms.

As part of its core business and supply chain, the tobacco companies provide a false impression that they are supportive of tobacco farming and its related communities by, among others, providing so-called CSR initiatives for technical and financial support for farming.⁶⁹ However, incentivizing tobacco farming goes against diversification, which is a key solution to addressing the health and environmental harms of tobacco.⁷⁰ Governments should instead incentivize alternative livelihood⁷¹, and should not be made to compete with tobacco industry incentives to tobacco production.

Financial arrangements contrived by the tobacco industry are purposed to keep farmers addicted to tobacco farming.⁷² Some of the incentives provided by tobacco companies, such as loans, are meant to continually lure tobacco farmers and workers into tobacco production and keep them dependent to it,⁷³ and ultimately, constantly indebted and impoverished.⁷⁴ This perpetuates the use of child labour.
03. Tobacco companies’ so-called Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives divert attention from tobacco’s impact on child labour

CSR activities on labour rights involve approaches that scholars have criticized as “ineffective in improving labour standards” (e.g., private voluntary initiatives like social auditing, ethical certification and supplier codes of conduct); due to the “serious gaps between CSR promises and actual outcomes.” Tobacco companies’ CSR, such as education programs, supplier due diligence or good environmental/agricultural practices, are worse in that, among others, they divert attention from tobacco company practices that perpetuate child labour and worsen its impact. The tobacco industry is primarily responsible for child labour in its supply chain because it keeps tobacco prices and wages low, then provide “incentives” that keep farmers in debt, deny bargaining powers to workers, allow working conditions to remain poor, drown out the voices of stakeholders and avoid direct responsibility for them.

Tobacco CSR builds their brand and corporate image, but obscures the extent of harm caused by tobacco production. A study that calls for stronger tobacco sponsorship bans show that the tobacco transnationals use Twitter to project that they are leading in the elimination of child labour but fail to show how they caused the problem. In many countries, publicizing these activities are deemed violation of sponsorship bans required by the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which is embodied in the UN SDGs.

04. Tobacco companies’ front groups hinder true stakeholder participation and drown out the voices of farmers and workers.

Global consensus and treaty policy dictates that tobacco companies have no place in policy making related to agricultural diversification, and that such efforts must be driven by workers/farmers. Specifically, governments are urged to promote “alternatives to tobacco growing and avoid tobacco industry obstruction in programs meant for the welfare and diversification of tobacco growers and workers and the protection of the environment...” However, tobacco farmers and workers directly affected in tobacco production and involved in environmental harms, are poorly represented. This is exacerbated by the fact that transnational tobacco companies have set up and funded front groups like International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA) to lobby on their behalf and to represent farmers’ socio-economic arguments for purposes of challenging tobacco control measures such as tax increases. Tobacco workers have also accused the tobacco companies of drowning their voices with false promises during discussions around the value of the tobacco industry-funded Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing (ECLT) Foundation. Furthermore, the tobacco industry took up stakeholder space in discussions on diversification through the Philip Morris funded Foundation for Smoke-Free World’s (FSFW) Agriculture Transformation Initiative (ATI), despite the need to protect agricultural and environmental policies on tobacco from commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry, in line with Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.
Notably, the interests of tobacco companies and laborers are diametrically opposed:
Tobacco industry’s interest is to seek the lowest price/highest profit and to avoid culpability for health and occupational harms; while the laborer’s interest is to increase prices and to be compensated for harms.

05. The tobacco industry avoids culpability and refuses to compensate children for damages.
Overall, the tobacco industry tries to distance itself from the reality of deaths and harms.92 Ultimately, any “social good” the tobacco industry does is fake if it does not acknowledge responsibility for all the deaths and diseases caused by its products throughout the product life cycle.

In the aspect of tobacco production, the tobacco industry has yet to be held accountable for failure to root out child labour in its supply chain. When held to account for children’s plight, it firmly avoids culpability through legal defenses and attempts to play the victim. Through its third-party contracts, tobacco companies try to distance themselves from being responsible for child labour. For instance,

- PMI claims to impose standards on its supply chain but, in different countries, uses third parties instead of direct purchase to impose this standard, thus, removing itself from potential liability.
- In 2020, children of Malawi sued British American Tobacco and Imperial Brands, both based in the UK for compensation to damages arising from child labour. And although this resulted in US barring imports of Malawi tobacco, the tobacco companies have sought a dismissal of the case based on the grounds that “lawyers for the farming families cannot prove the tobacco they grew ended up in their cigarettes and other products.”98
- In 2007, Brazilian tobacco companies sought to escape employer duties by pointing to the service agreement contract (as opposed to an employment contract). This supports the observation that the tobacco company’s response to human rights involves shifting the ultimate culpability to leaf companies and dressing this up with public relations strategies.99
- In a Brazilian Child Labour investigation in 1998, the producers (primarily BAT affiliates) were found to be “the victims, and not the responsible party, since they ended up being forced to rely on their children’s work in order to meet the conditions stipulated in the clauses imposed by the companies”.100
- In 2021, a large Brazilian tobacco exporter faced slavery charges for contractual employment of nine children, all underpaid, living in poor conditions and suffering from acute intoxication and nausea. The company said it was not responsible for the workers, despite having a contract with the farm owners.101

Notably, governments are mandated to cooperate with one another in dealing with tobacco industry liability, including compensation.102 The tobacco industry, which continues to forego responsibility for the illegal exploitation of children in the tobacco industry’s production workforce, needs to be called to account.
References

1. Not all forms of working by children are illegal. Child labour is a subset of working children because child labour excludes children who work only a few hours a week in permitted light work and those who are at the minimum age who engage in work not classified as a worst form of child labour.


9. It is up to governments to make this classification of hazardous work. ILO has a comendium of several (not all) countries and what they classify as hazardous work. Parties to C- 182 are required to design and implement a national action plan on the elimination of child labour and to set up a mechanism to oversee, monitor, and report on its implementation. See: Ramos AK. Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production: A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Health Hum Rights. 2018;20(2):235-248. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182


13. "The tobacco industry should stop all political lobbying activities and avoid all cloudly scientific statements. They could even completely withdraw from issuing scientific statements at all and rather publish those of the WHO or other reliable sources on their websites and in their CSR reports. Tobacco companies should stop using philanthropic engagement for building reputation. Philip Morris may for instance continue the engagement against domestic violence, they may even continue to use this engagement for internal motivation and identification, but they should not publicly talk about it." See: Palazzo, G., & Richter, U. CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 61(4), 387-401 (November 2005). Retrieved from: https://www.ijst.org/stable/25123633?seq=1

14. "Moreover, Parties shall act to protect the implementation of Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC against the commercial and vested interests (interference) by the tobacco industry in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Convention and the guidelines for its implementation." See: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHOM Framework Convention on Tobacco Control). Report by the working group. Conference of the Parties to the WHOM Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; sixth session. FCTC/COP/6/12 (17 August 2014). Available from: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_12_en.pdf


20. “The study conducted by the ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), says child labour - which involves one in every six children in the world - can be eliminated and replaced by universal education by the year 2020 at an estimated total cost of US$ 760 billion. The study argues that the costs are a “wise investment” yielding global benefits of just over US$ 5 trillion.” Yet even if the effect of education on future earnings was halved to 5 percent, the study estimates that global benefits would still exceed US$ 2 trillion.” See: New ILO study says economic benefits of eliminating child labour will vastly outweigh costs. International Labour Organisation (3 February 2004). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_050220/lang--en/index.htm; See also: Sustainable Supply Chain Management - Progress 2019. Available at: https://www.pmi.org/integrated-report-2019-operating-with-excellence/sustainable-supply-chain-management-progress-2019


22. Lack of appropriate legal framework and government policies are emphasised as important areas for improvement. It is thus recognised that laws and statutes are not very useful unless they are followed up by efficient implementation processes. Other causes listed, e.g. in Ghana: low family incomes, large family sizes, lack of resources to develop land, discriminatory and tenure system/presences on land, piece-rate system of work, low wages of formal sector employees, tribal ethnic conflicts, underemployment, certain traditional/cultural beliefs and practices, irresponsible parentage, lack of proper legislation, large informal sector, debt bondage, single parenthood, societal acceptance of child labour as part of child upbringing, collapse of extended family systems, preference of boy child to girl education, lack of social protection for orphans. See: Line Eldring, Sabata Nakananye and Malehoko Tshoaedi. Child Labour in the Tobacco Growing Sector in Africa - Report prepared for the IUF/BAT Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, Nairoi, 8-9th October 2000. Fafio-paper 2000:21 (November 2000). Available at: https://fafo.no/images/pub/2000/654.pdf


24. For example: “Protecting human rights is a clear priority for us and we are proud of what we have achieved so far. It is 20 years since we became founder members of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco (ECLT) Foundation. We have robust policies in place outlining our commitments to ensuring our operations are free from child labour and exploitation of labour, underpinned by comprehensive due diligence monitoring and remediation programmes” – BAT Human Rights report. 2020

25. “…we will allocate our resources and efforts toward further implementing our Living Income program, which we consider a key enabler to address labour abuses and particularly child labour issues.” – PMI Integrated report, 2020


27. “We would like to thank the ECLT Foundation, their Board of Directors, as well as all ECLT Secretariat members for a tremendously successful and rewarding two-decade partnership. We expect and look forward to continuing to support the Foundation’s mission at the local level in its continued efforts to eliminate child labour from tobacco-growing supply chains.” - Mauro Gonzalez, PMI Director, Sustainable Agriculture, PMI Integrated report, 2020

28. “Protecting human rights is a clear priority for us and we are proud of what we have achieved so far. It is 20 years since we became founder members of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco (ECLT) Foundation. We have robust policies in place outlining our commitments to ensuring our operations are free from child labour and exploitation of labour, underpinned by comprehensive due diligence monitoring and remediation programmes” – BAT Human Rights report, 2020

29. “PMI ... arguing that “[t]obacco growing and manufacturing take around one-third of the water required to make the same amount of tea or one-sixth of that of coffee or chocolate (per weight of finished product)” ...PMI’s companion attempts to put tobacco on par with these other products, ignoring the differentiator that these other products do not kill one in two of their daily users, as tobacco does...” See: Hendlin, Y.H., Bialous, S.A. The environmental externalities of tobacco manufacturing: A review of tobacco industry reporting. Ambio 49, 17–34 (2020). Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13280-019-01148-3


29. “The total economic cost of smoking (from health expenditures and productivity losses together) totalled PPP $1582 billion (US$1436 billion) in 2012, equivalent in magnitude to 1.8% of the world’s annual gross domestic product (GDP). Almost 40% of this cost occurred in developing countries, highlighting the substantial burden these countries suffer.” See: Goodchild M, Nargis N, Tursan d’Espaignet E. Global economic cost of smoking-attributable diseases. Tobacco Control (2018);27:58-64. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/1/58


33. Private sector initiatives such as the Cocoa Initiative, a voluntary agreement among industry actors to set up a foundation to address farming concerns alongside governments, and is currently recognized for good practices, is not congruous for the tobacco sector. (Cocoa Initiative: In 2001, a voluntary agreement called the Harkin-Engel Protocol, was accepted by the international cocoa and chocolate industry to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, as defined by ILO’s Convention 182, in West Africa. See: The Harkin-Engel Protocol. Slave Free Chocolate (2011) [website]. Available at: https://slavefreechocolate.org/harkin-engel-protocol"

34. McKnight, R, and Spiller, HA. Green tobacco sickness in children and adolescents. Public Health Rep 2005;120(6):602-605. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1897768/; See also: Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production. A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Athena K. Ramos. Health and Human Rights 20(2):235-248 (December 2018). Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6299346/ (accessed on 21 May 2021); See also: Based on a profile of farmers in Brazil: “When assessing the health risks and the conditions affecting tobacco growers, the top three symptoms reported were: back pain (68%), post-harvesting sickness (53%) and depression (42%).” See: Lee, T. Country practices in the implementation of Article 17 (Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing) of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. WHO FCTC (December 2019). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/implementation/publications/country-practices-implementation-article-17-WHO-FCTC-PDF
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37. Due to heavy lifting, climbing and strenuous manual labour for long hours in insect-laden dirty fields, including in extreme weather conditions, the child suffers from diseases, infections, fatigue, malnutrition as well as open wounds, lacerations and bruises caused by sharp equipment and lack of personal protective equipment. See: Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production: A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Athena K. Ramos. Health and Human Rights 202(235-248) (December 2018). Available at: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6293346/; See also: Hazardous child labour in agriculture, tobacco sector (Safety and health). ILO (1 April 2004). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/gpec/Resources/Examples/12965564928.pdf; See also: CRC provisions affected by child labour includes, among others, the right to be protected from injury or exploitation (Article 19), right to highest attainable standard of health (Article 24), right to education (Article 28), right to leisure (Article 31) and the right to be protected from commercial exploitation (Article 32).

38. Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents... See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

39. “...Brazil...farmer advocates...see as unfair practices by large tobacco companies. Farm families are not guaranteed minimum earnings. The companies determine both the price of the agricultural inputs—seeds, pesticides, and other supplies, which are required to buy from the companies—as well as the price and classification of the tobacco leaf once it’s harvested. Small farmers have little control or room to negotiate.” See: Margaret Wurth. Tobacco’s Children. Brazil Sets an Example for the U.S. The Progressive (3 November 2015). Available at: https://progressive.org/magazine/tobacco-s-children-brazil-sets-example-us/.

40. “...Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents. Living and working conditions are poor, perpetuating extreme forms of child labour and a growing problem of human trafficking. Conditions of work include low wages and salaries, low tobacco prices, the lack of written contracts, poor infrastructure, effective bargaining arrangements, lack of freedom of association, poor housing, poor drinking water, polluted soils, reduced protections of occupational health and safety, and lack of capital.” See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

41. “...As for smallholder farmers, they lack arable land for farming, and experience shortages of capital, high input rates, and high loan interest rates for inputs and they lack access to markets for their products.” See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

42. Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; COP/C61/11 (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/implementation/publications/country-practices-implementation-article-17-WHO-FCTC-PDF.

43. “...Tobacco companies, leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents... See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

44. Brazil, Tobacco Workers Union (Sintrafumo), which tried to unify factory workers and producers. In 1989, a joint strike was called to protest against the reduction in the tobacco leaf price. The companies wanted to reduce the workers to company contracts, and it ceased to exist. As time went by, class associations were called to take part in negotiations and reduced their resistance. See: https://actbr.org.br/uploads/arquivos/Suma_e_80_anos_dos_trabalhadores.pdf; Cited in: Tobacco and Allied Farmers Workers’ Union Malawi, Tobacco workers to ILO: Quit Tobacco Industry. Unfair Tobacco (29 September 2017). Available at: www.unfairtobacco.org/en/tobacco-workers-to-ilo-quit-tobacco-industry/.

45. In Brazil, Tobacco Workers Union (Sintrafumo), which tried to unify factory workers and producers. In 1989, a joint strike was held for the first time, with roadblocks and factory gate picketing, as they wanted a guarantee of payment after the tobacco harvest. They local public prosecutor declared that TOAWUM do not exist as union as part of negotiations, and it ceased to exist. As time went by, class associations were called to take part in negotiations and reduced their resistance. There are now cities, or associations in the producing regions willing to put pressure on corporations for them to improve the producers’ situation. See: Peres, J. and Neto, M. Roucos E Sufocados: Tobacco Industry Lives and Kills. Available at: https://asตาร.org.br/uploads/arquivos/Suma%CC%81rio_Roucos_E_Sufocados.pdf; Cited in: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

46. Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

47. Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

48. Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents. See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

49. Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

50. Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

51. Tobacco Industry and Child Labor: Excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals as well as shifting cultivation to virgin fertile lands. Their deceptive CSR programs shift attention away from real issues, such as keeping tobacco prices very low, socio-economic inequalities, child labour, health hazards, undermining the voices of farmers, instead of addressing them. See: Locucio N, Almeida GEG, Abdallah JM, et al. Environmental health impacts of tobacco farming: a review of the literature. Tobacco Control (February 2012)21:191-196. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/191; See also: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

52. Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

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60. Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOWAUM)’s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).
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53. Consequences of tobacco production on the child: • Injuries from cutting tools ranging from minor cuts to severe wounds • Injuries from contact with, or entanglement in, unguarded machinery or being hit by motorized vehicles • Poisoning and long-term health problems from using or being exposed to pesticides • Musculoskeletal injuries from repetitive and forceful movements, bending, and carrying heavy or awkward loads • Heat exhaustion • High levels of sun exposure which can result in skin cancer • Snake and insect bites • Green tobacco sickness can make workers nauseous. It is caused by nicotine and other substances being absorbed through the skin from contact with wet tobacco leaves.” See: Agriculture: A hazardous work. ILO (23 March 2015). Available from: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/safety-and-health-at-work/areasofwork/hazardous-work/WCMS_356650/lang--en/index.htm

54. Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP7(10) (2014). Available from: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1

55. DECISION: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; seventh session; FCTC/COP/7(10) (12 November 2016). Available from: https://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP7(10)_EN.pdf?ua=1


57. Warner, Kenneth (2000). The Economics of Tobacco: Myths and Realities. Tobacco control. 9. 78-89. 10.1136/cht.9.1.78. Available from: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/9/1/78.full.pdf


60. Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available from: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1

61. “Many farmers—including many with contracts with oligopolistic leaf-buying companies—pay too much for inputs (e.g., fertilizer, pesticides, etc.), receive very low prices for their leaf, and dedicate hundreds of hours to a mostly unprofitable economic pursuit. The opportunity costs of farming tobacco are high, with farmers missing out on human capital development and more lucrative economic opportunities.” See: Issue: Growing. The Tobacco Atlas [website]. Available at: https://tobaccoatlas.org/topic/growing/ (accessed 8 June 2021); See also: Jones, A., Austin, W., & Altman, D. Tobacco Farmers and Tobacco Manufacturers: Implications for Tobacco Control in Tobacco-Growing Developing Countries. Journal of Public Health Policy, 29(4), 406-423. (2008). Available at: http://www.istore.org/keyword/40027207; See also: “Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAUMEN represents...” See also: Policy Options. Public financing and incentives directly linked to tobacco leaf growing should be discontinued, in accordance with national law and policies, taking into account possible adverse impact on tobacco growers. ”Proposed actions. 1. Tobacco-growing countries should not encourage and not provide any incentives to increase the acreage of land used for cultivating tobacco. 2. Tobacco-growing countries should consider reallocating public funds/subsidies used for tobacco production to alternative livelihood activities.” See: Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available from: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1


64. Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available from: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1

65. Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18), Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available from: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1
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69. “In Thailand, Philip Morris International funds environmental projects to achieve their own ends by supporting villagers in tobacco growing regions. For example, funding the Prime Virtual Administration Organization (PVAGO) to create dams in their region to provide water for agricultural production and fire protection.” See: The Tobacco Industry and Corporate Social Responsibility: A View From South America, South East Asia Tobacco Industry Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SIO), SEATCA (June 2011). Available at: https://seatca.org/edm/documents/CSP%20fact%20sheet.pdf.


74. “The tobacco industry’s response to such environmental harms was to work with agricultural front groups and partnering with renowned organisations in order to lobby against tobacco control measures. Through these front groups such as ITGA, tobacco companies worked with sympathetic businessmen and politicians. The tobacco companies also encouraged excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals as well as shifting cultivation to virgin fertile lands. Their deceptive CSR programs shift attention away from real issues, such as keeping tobacco prices very low, socio-economic inequalities, child labour, health hazards, undermining the voices of farmers, instead of addressing them. See: Lecours, N, Almeida GEG, Abdallah JM, et al. Environmental impacts of tobacco farming: a review of the literature. Tobacco Control (February 2012);21:191-196. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/191.


76. The tobacco industry lobbies using Twitter as a new communication platform to oppose tobacco control policy and shape their public identity. Tobacco Control Published Online First: 17 April 2018. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/27/3/395.

77. The eco-labeling of tobacco products and the creation of the eco-industry are mechanisms that the tobacco industry has employed to create the image of its products as environmentally friendly. 

78. “We have a rich heritage and, we believe, a bright future': how transnational tobacco companies are using Twitter to oppose policy and shape their public identity. Tobacco Control Published Online First: 17 April 2018. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/28/2/227.

79. “We have a rich heritage and, we believe, a bright future': how transnational tobacco companies are using Twitter to oppose policy and shape their public identity. Tobacco Control Published Online First: 17 April 2018. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/28/2/227.
84. The tobacco industry’s response to such environmental harms was to work with agricultural front groups and partnering with renowned organisations in order to lobby against tobacco control measures. Through these front groups such as ITGA, tobacco companies worked with sympathetic businessmen and politicians. The tobacco companies also encouraged excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals as well as shifting cultivation to virgin fertile lands. Their deceptive CSR programs shift attention away from real issues, such as keeping tobacco prices very low, socio-economic inequalities, child labour, health hazards, undermining the voices of farmers, instead of addressing them. See: Lecours N, Almeida GEG, Abdlahim JM, et al. Environmental health impacts of tobacco farming: a review of the literature. Tobacco Control (February 2012); 21(2):191-196. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/191


91. “To urge large, as well as medium and small tobacco groups, when implementing Articles 17 and 18, to adopt a whole-of-government and stakeholder participatory approaches keeping in mind Article 5.3 in promoting alternatives to tobacco growing, and avoid tobacco industry obstruction in programmes meant for the welfare and diversification of tobacco growers and workers and the protection of the environment, as appropriate in the national context.” See: DECISION: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, seventh session; Decision FCT/COP7(10) (12 November 2016). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP7(10)_EN.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 5 June 2021).

92. Tobacco Industry Front Groups and Activities. South East Asia Tobacco Industry Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SSS), SEATCA (October 2010). Available at: https://africa.wrr.org/mdimodules/7%20Front%20groups%20etc%20sheet.pdf ; See also: Tobacco Industry Front Group: The International Tobacco Growers Association. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (November 2012). Available at: https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/EN_WT_interference_ITGA_fact_sheet.pdf ; See also: ITGA claims “The aim of the association is to share non-confidential information and monitor market conditions, build substantial mutual understanding and protect members and their dependents. Its policies and activities are developed by the growers to further their own interests.” However, tobacco industry documents reveal that the true intention behind ITGA is to advance tobacco industry lobbying, especially in developing countries. In the early nineties, one of ITGA’s specific aim was to dilute WHO’s tobacco control efforts. They expanded UN’s work on tobacco beyond the WHO. They stressed that a successful “Tobacco and Health Program” will cause a negative socio-economic impact on countries that produce tobacco. See: Emma Must. ITGA uncovered: Unravelling the spin – the truth behind the claims. PATH Canada Guide (June 2001). Available at: https://healthbridge.ca/images/uploads/library/1gbpr.pdf


191. “Because, one of the key obligations of the tobacco industry to is to distance itself from its own former behavior demanding that the public should judge it by its current actions and not by its past actions. By portraying themselves as industry and CSR engagement as well as CSR rhetoric are key elements of this strategy. However, a lot of relevant studies still do not trust tobacco corporations because they do not believe in a genuine rupture with the past. The discovery of CSR in the tobacco industry is suspected to blur the “real” intentions of the corporations, their hidden agenda of business as usual. And indeed, some patterns of behavior of tobacco companies give reason to distrust the authenticity of their CSR engagement.”. See: awang owang ollong, Kingsly. Cont ades of tobacco from the Universal subsidiary starting with the 2019 crop. Universal said the supply agreement “is expected to

199. See: Leco (2019). Tobacco Industry Front Groups and Activities. South East Asia Tobacco Industry Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SSS), SEATCA (October 2010). Available at: https://africa.wrr.org/mdimodules/7%20Front%20groups%20etc%20sheet.pdf ; See also: Tobacco Industry Front Group: The International Tobacco Growers Association. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (November 2012). Available at: https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/EN_WT_interference_ITGA_fact_sheet.pdf ; See also: ITGA claims “The aim of the association is to share non-confidential information and monitor market conditions, build substantial mutual understanding and protect members and their dependents. Its policies and activities are developed by the growers to further their own interests.” However, tobacco industry documents reveal that the true intention behind ITGA is to advance tobacco industry lobbying, especially in developing countries. In the early nineties, one of ITGA’s specific aim was to dilute WHO’s tobacco control efforts. They expanded UN’s work on tobacco beyond the WHO. They stressed that a successful “Tobacco and Health Program” will cause a negative socio-economic impact on countries that produce tobacco. See: Emma Must. ITGA uncovered: Unravelling the spin – the truth behind the claims. PATH Canada Guide (June 2001). Available at: https://healthbridge.ca/images/uploads/library/1gbpr.pdf

208. See also: Kingsly. Cont ades of tobacco from the Universal subsidiary starting with the 2019 crop. Universal said the supply agreement “is expected to...
99. Forthcoming publication ‘Towards health with justice 2’ by World Health Organisation, Eastern Mediterranean Region. See also: Letter to the United Nations Global Compact: Remove ECLT as a Participant. STOP (30 April 2021). Available at: https://explosetobacco.org/news/ungc-edl/; See also: Industry Brief: Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing (ECLT) Foundation. STOP (31 October 2019). Available at: http://explosetobacco.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/STOP_ECLT_brief.pdf; See also: “For example, in 2014, Phillip Morris International noted that it would buy tobacco only from third-party leaf companies rather than from direct contracts with growers, which was promoted as way to increase accountability, oversight, and implementation of strict standards regarding child labour.” “However, this transferred responsibility for monitoring child labour from the tobacco companies to the leaf companies, while allowing the tobacco companies to reap the benefit of cheap leaf products and continue to escape culpability for the problem. By promoting these types of initiatives, tobacco companies stand to gain political support and weaken opposition, especially in low-income and middle-income countries, where there may be less external monitoring by civil society and where financial contributions from these companies may have a greater impact.” See: Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production: A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Athena K. Ramos. Health and Human Rights Journal (7 August 2018). Available at: https://www.hhrjournal.org/2018/08/child-labour-in-global-tobacco-production-a-human-rights-approach-to-an-enduring-dilemma/.

100. “In 2007, the Labour Court filed a series of lawsuits in order for the companies to acknowledge a relationship of employment with the producers. The private sector, however, alleges that there is just a service agreement contract held between the two parties. “Everything has a high impact. They talk about this contract of integration as if it were something very common, as if there was nothing illegal about it. It’s very naturalized”, says prosecutor Margaret Matas de Carvalho. “ See: João Peres/Moriti Neto. Tobacco Industry Lives and Kills - Executive Summary. Roucos e Sufocados. Available at: https://actbr.org.br/uploads/arquivos/Suma%C3%A9rio_Roucos_Ingles.pdf
